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3.
BRITISH FORCES IN LIBYA
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The Committee considered a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary
(OPD(67) 64) about the future stationing of British forces in Libya.
THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that on 2nd July the new Libyan
Government had reaffirmed the intention(first stated by the previous Government on 15th June) of seeking the liquidation of our bases and the
withdrawal of our troops and had said they wished to begin negotiations
on 1st August. Our forces were at present deployed at Benghazi, Tobruk and El Adem (RAF). The Libyan Government had made it clear that they
would in any event wish us to withdraw our forces from Benghazi, and
withdrawal preferably before the end of 1967 would be to our advantage.
The question arose however whether we should not take the opportunity to
withdraw our forces altogether from Libya and modify or eliminate our
treaty commitment to Libya to provide military assistance in the event
of external attack. The King had however made it clear that he attached
importance to the presence of the RAF at El Adem, and it appeared that the
request for our withdrawal had been made mainly as a gesture to appease
public opinion in Libya at a time when feelings were influenced against
us by Egyption accusation of our intervention on the side of Israel in
the Arab/Israel war. El Adem was valuable to us as a staging post for
RAF training and as an entry point for Army training in Cyrenaica, where
the training areas available to us were of considerable value.
military grounds we could not retain RAF El Adem without also retaining
the Army unit and installations at Tobruk. The Libyan Foreign Minister
had also told our Ambassador that it was their firm policy to maintain
the treaty indefinitely in the interest of our two countries. Withdrawal
from El Adem against the King's wishes could cause a sharp loss of
confidence on his part and that of the Libyan Government in their
relationship with us, which could have adverse consequences for our
valuable export trade, including prospective arms exports, perhaps for
the operations of British Petroleum in Libya, and the loss of the training
areas. The long-term political and strategic risks of a complete
withdrawal from Libya at present were also considerable.
On
Comfort would
be given to extremist pro-Egyptian elements who might be encouraged
thereby to overthrow the monarchy and bring the country under Egyptian
domination. On the other hand, if we retained a sufficient military
presence in Libya we should avoid the risk of giving a stimulus to
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